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Abstract—Various communication protocols are currently 
used in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. One of the protocols 
that are already standardized by ISO is MQTT protocol (ISO / 
IEC 20922: 2016). Many IoT developers use this protocol because 
of its minimal bandwidth requirement and low memory 
consumption. Sometimes, IoT device sends confidential data that 
should only be accessed by authorized people or devices. 
Unfortunately, the MQTT protocol only provides authentication 
for the security mechanism which, by default, does not encrypt 
the data in transit thus data privacy, authentication, and data 
integrity become problems in MQTT implementation. This paper 
discusses several reasons on why there are many IoT system that 
does not implement adequate security mechanism. Next, it also 
demonstrates and analyzes how we can attack this protocol easily 
using several attack scenarios. Finally, after the vulnerabilities of 
this protocol have been examined, we can improve our security 
awareness especially in MQTT protocol and then implement 
security mechanism in our MQTT system to prevent such attack. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Internet of Things (IoT) or inter-machine communication 
(M2M) over the internet is a concept that allows 
communication between devices over the Internet. The number 
of IoT devices is growing rapidly where Cisco IBSG predicts 
the number of IoT devices will reach 50 billion by 2020 [1]. 
Moreover, Gartner predicts, by 2020, the internet of things 
devices will be made up of 20.4 billion units [2]. IoT plays a 
major role in smart city implementation like smart home, smart 
transportation, and smart parking. 
Nowadays, many protocols are used as a communication 
protocol in the IoT devices. Five of the most prominent 
protocols used for IoT is Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), 
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), Extensible 
Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), Advanced Message 
Queuing Protocol (AMQP), and MQ Telemetry Protocol 
(MQTT) [3]. Some considerations that must be taken into 
account when we choose the protocol are energy efficiency 
(total consumed energy for the given execution time), 
performance (total transmission time it takes to send messages 
and receive their acknowledgments), resource usage (CPU, 
RAM, and ROM usage), and reliability (ability to avoid packet 
loss, i.e. QoS) [4]. Moreover, when advanced functionalities 
(e.g. message persistence, wills, and exactly once delivery), 
reliability, and ability to secure multicast message are highly 
considered, MQTT protocol is one of the best options [5].  
A. MQTT Protocol 
MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is a messaging protocol 
using a publish/subscribe mechanism which is originally 
designed by Andy Stanford-Clark and Arlen Nipper. It is 
currently in the OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards) standard.  
Currently, the MQTT protocol also has standard defined in 
ISO/IEC 20922: 2016 (Information technology - Message 
Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) v3.1.1). This protocol 
is used widely for IoT system that has limited resources 
because of several reasons: lightweight, small bandwidth 
requirement, open and straightforward to be implemented [6].  
Figure 1 shows the example of the usage of MQTT 
protocol. Publish and subscribe operations can be analogized 
like client and server models. The central server in MQTT is 
named broker that acts as the recipient of the message from 
the client which is, essentially, the entire node involved in the 
communication process [7]. The message itself can be in the 
form of publish or subscribe topic. Furthermore, all the 
devices connected using this protocol can become publishers 
and subscribers. Usually, in MQTT architecture, several 
sensors periodically publish the results of their measurements 
(i.e. payload data) to a topic address. Every device that has 
been registered as a subscriber to a specific topic will receive a 
message from the broker each time the topic is updated. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example of MQTT protocol use case.  
B. Security Requirement and Attack Surface 
Information security is also an important thing to consider 
during making the decision of the protocols because some of 
the communication protocols in the IoT devices do not have a 
comprehensive information security mechanism. According to 
a book published by ISACA [8], the object of information 
security consists of three components: data confidentiality, data 
integrity, and data availability. There is also access levels 
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security requirements such as authentication, authorization, and 
access control which are explained in [9]. In fact, MQTT 
protocol is one of the protocols that do not yet have overall 
security mechanism because it only has authentication 
mechanism without encryption capabilities. 
There are various considerations for IoT developer who 
wants to design security solutions in the IoT communication 
protocol. Firstly, the limitation of the IoT device itself (e.g. 
compute performance and low power consumption) that 
require a lightweight security protocol with small code 
footprint. Secondly, the heterogeneous environment where 
each of connected device may use different protocol and 
different security mechanism. Lastly, the reliability of network 
which may forces as to use security mechanism with minimum 
overhead [10]. 
By understanding the security requirement for IoT devices, 
we can now discuss the attack surface in IoT. Attack surface is 
a vulnerability that can be accessed and exploited in a system 
[11]. In [9], attack surface in IoT is divided into local network 
and public network. The local network is analog to internal 
attack where the attacker is on the same network as the IoT 
devices while the public network is analog to external attack 
where the attacker might reside anywhere in the public network 
to attack the IoT system [9].  
Last year, a major incident related to IoT system was 
reported by RSA where the hackers had hijacked many IoT 
devices and provided access to compromised IoT devices and 
cameras in criminal forum [12]. Moreover, there was a 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack to 
krebsonsecurity.com site performed by botnets embedded in 
the IoT devices. Finally, taken from data owned by Threat 
Research Akamai team [13], there were reportedly millions of 
IoT devices used as proxies to route victims traffic to malicious 
sites. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section explains several reasons for why IoT 
implementation in the world does not use security mechanism. 
A. Resource Constrained Device 
There are many devices categorized as a constrained device 
which, according to RFC 7228 [14], is further divided into 
three classes based on their RAM and ROM as follows. 
TABLE I.  CLASS IN CONSTRAINED DEVICE (RFC 7228) 
Class RAM (Data Size) Flash (Code Size) 
Class 0 << 10 KB << 100KB 
Class 1 ~ 10 KB ~ 100KB 
Class 2 ~ 50 KB ~250KB 
 Because of the very limited computing performance, most 
of the resource constrained devices, especially class 0 device, 
cannot handle most of the security approaches [15], notably the 
mechanism which has heavy computation such as running TLS 
for transport security. 
B. Vast number of devices 
The significant number of connected devices appears to 
create more vulnerabilities [16]. For IT department, it is 
cumbersome to manage many different types of devices [17] 
especially when the security mechanism is applied to IoT 
system. For example, by using username and password to 
authenticate, the IT department will have to put much effort to 
maintain the security credentials (e.g. change the password 
periodically). 
C. Lack of security awareness  
The lack of security awareness makes a developer may 
prefer to choose functionality over security when trade-offs 
must be done [18]. On the other hand, according to the 
Bitdefender survey study [19] at US, Romania, Germany, 
Australia, France, and UK, only less than 50% of people from 
each country that aware of almost all security awareness 
parameters (e.g. privacy concerns, losing control of smart 
device, frequency of a software update). Another study from 
HP Fortify states that 70% of devices use unencrypted network 
service [20]. 
III. ATTACK SCENARIOS ON MQTT PROTOCOL 
In this section, we will discuss how an attack can be carried 
out on the MQTT protocol.  
First, we assume that we do not know anything about the 
victim system that we want to attack (i.e. no prior knowledge 
of the infrastructure, defense mechanisms, and communication 
channels). This type of assumption is called black box 
penetration testing [21]. The attack is begun by performing 
information gathering that can be accomplished by using 
Shodan, Masscan, or NMAP [22]. For this paper, Shodan 
search engine will be utilized. 
By inputting string “ port:1883 “MQTT” ”  in search box 
inside Shodan, we perform searching on MQTT protocol on 
port 1883, the default MQTT broker port that doesn’t use TLS 
mechanism for security purpose, to find available broker 
server. The search result provided in figure 2 shows at that 
moment (April 27, 2017), there were 24998 brokers with 
default port successfully indexed by Shodan. 
 
Fig. 2. Result of MQTT broker on port 1883 in Shodan 
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 Fig. 3. MQTT connection code in Shodan Page search result 
Besides the result shown in Figure 2, there is also MQTT 
connection code on the right of each broker that is provided in 
Figure 3. All the brokers that have connection code of “0” are 
easier to be attacked because this kind of broker does not use 
any client authentication mechanism thus anonymous publisher 
or subscriber can connect to this broker freely. 
For the first scenario, we can start to subscribe to all topics 
in that broker (subscribe to #) which may give us confidential 
data to be analyzed later. This attack scenario is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Attacker can subscribe to all topic message 
Another scenario can be initiated by publishing data to the 
broker who does not have authentication mechanism which is 
illustrated in Figure 5. Street lamps act as subscriber where the 
legal publisher can publish a message to control the street 
lamps. On the other hand, since the broker does not have an 
authentication mechanism, an attacker can subscribe to the 
broker to get any message that is used to control the street 
lamps. By analyzing the control message, the attacker can 
publish his message to take over the street lights. This kind of 
scenario can also be used by an attacker to publish spam data 
so that both broker and subscriber get flooded and may result 
in denial of service. 
 
Fig. 5. Attack scenario from attacker’s publisher 
The first and second scenarios are a generic scenario that 
can be applied both in the local network and public network. 
The next scenario that will be discussed has the assumption 
that the attacker is connected to the same network with IoT 
system (e.g. at publisher network or broker network). 
 
 Using this assumption, the attacker can perform traffic 
analysis on that network to extract valuable information from 
data in-transit of MQTT protocol in the form of plain text, such 
as: 
a. IP broker (usually public IP address) 
b. Name of topic  
c. Data payload  
d. Port number of MQTT that IoT system use 
To demonstrate this scenario, an Espectro board (based on 
ESP 8266 board) will act as a publisher and is on the same 
wireless network as the attacker computer which runs Kali 
Linux operating system. Meanwhile, subscriber and broker are 
on the another network. Publisher device publishes to topic 
“outTopic”, with message payload “hello world”, while, for 
this demonstration, the subscriber will subscribe to all topic (#).  
The attacker will use Wireshark and Ettercap to perform the 
attack. An attacker that is in the same network with a publisher 
can sniff and modify the data in transit thus he can exploit the 
data privacy, authenticity, and integrity of MQTT packet. 
A. Data privacy 
Data privacy in MQTT message is absolutely an issue 
since, by default, MQTT does not provide any data 
encryption. Whether the broker system uses authentication 
mechanism or not, the attacker can still sniff the data in transit 
easily. Figure 6 gives a screenshot of attacker’s Wireshark 
packet capture that shows the MQTT topic and message of the 
data in-transit from the publisher device earlier. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Published message that captured in Wireshark 
B. Authentication 
If the broker uses client authentication mechanism by 
using username and password, the attacker could not act as 
publisher or subscriber as long as the attacker does not know 
the username and password (i.e. MQTT connection code will 
be 5 if we don’t provide username-password, or 4 if bad 
username or password is supplied). In the case of our scenario, 
the attacker is in the same network with the publisher. Thus 
the attacker can sniff the traffic on the network while waiting 
for a “Connect” packet from the publisher is in transit so that 
the username and password that are used to connect to the 
broker can be revealed.  
During the authentication process, there is a header in the 
packet known as KeepAlive which indicates how long the IoT 
device (publisher/subscriber) remains connected to the broker. 
Therefore, when the KeepAlive time is expired, the device 
(publisher/subscriber) will resend the “Connect” packet to 
restart the connection. Figure 7 shows the “Connect” packet 
from the publisher that has been sniffed by the attacker. 
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 Fig. 7. Result of sniffing the MQTT Connect command packet 
C. Data Integrity 
Another possible attack is targeting the integrity of data in 
transit. The attacker who has already known the data packets 
by sniffing the traffic can modify the data in transit. In this 
scenario, the attacker wants to change the topic name from 
“outTopic” to “outTopuc”. To do so, the attacker makes a 
filter file (named owned.filter) which will filter the packet data 
in transit that has TCP port 1883 and destination address to 
broker IP. After the packet that matched the filter criteria is 
identified, it will also search the string “outTopic” and replace 
it with “outTopuc” as seen in figure 8. Next, Etterfilter 
application is used to compile “owned.filter” file which will 
give an output file named “owned.ef”.  
#owned.filter 
if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 1883 && ip.dst == 'IP Broker' && 
search(DATA.data, "outTopic")) { 
   replace("outTopic", "outTopuc"); 
   msg("payload replaced\n"); 
} 
Fig. 8.  Filter file to filter MQTT packet 
Finally, by using Ettercap application running at the 
specific interface in which the attacker used to connect to the 
internet, the attacker uses the compiled filter to modify the 
packet after successfully performed ARP poisoning to make 
another network connection going through the attacker 
computer. This step is given in figure 9.  
etterfilter owned.filter -o owned.ef 
ettercap -T -q -i eth0 -F owned.ef -M ARP /// /// 
Fig. 9. Command to run ettercap with specific parameter 
Figure 10 shows published message topic that has been 
successfully altered and has been received in subscriber 
device. Because the subscriber subscribes to all topic, it still 
receives the message. Furthermore, the attacker can change 
the message to execute another interesting attack in this 
protocol. One of the interesting scenarios happens when 
attacker identifies someone who sends a link to download a 
firmware update for some devices over MQTT. The attacker 
can change the link in such way that the victim devices install 
malicious firmware that transforms them into botnets. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Result of change in topic name 
D. Port Obscurity 
The official IANA port number used by MQTT is 1883 for 
the regular MQTT and 8883 for MQTT using SSL / TLS. 
However, a broker administrator can configure to use the non-
standard port on the system. Unfortunately, if the security 
mechanism only depends on the MQTT protocol itself, the 
attacker can still easily observe packets that pass through the 
network.  
For example, the attacker can use Wireshark to sniff the 
packet and apply data filtering by selecting Edit menu  Find 
packet …  Type MQTT  String and Packet Byte. This 
filtering can be done because, in the MQTT, there is a variable 
header containing the MQTT protocol name that is sent along 
with the “Connect” packet by the client (publisher or 
subscriber) to the server (broker). Figure 11 shows MQTT 
data packet in port 1884 from Wireshark application. 
 
 
Fig. 11. MQTT packet in port 1884 
E. Botnet over MQTT 
Botnet over MQTT had been presented during Defcon 24 
event, which demonstrated BotMaster sent a command to bots 
over MQTT protocol [23]. A botnet is a network consisting of 
many bots--a new type of malware installed on a compromised 
computer--which then can be controlled by BotMaster [24]. 
We can obtain a broker using Shodan search engine as we 
have done before and transform it to become free broker 
server that connects attacker to victim’s device. By using this 
scenario, the attacker can hide from any investigation because 
he uses the unsecured broker as an arbiter to communicate 
with the botnet. 
As we can see in figure 12, BotMaster acts as commander 
to a botnet and uses a certain broker to control many IoT 
devices (botnet) at once with only one published message in a 
specific topic. BotMaster can also receive victim status and 
subscribe to the status of every IoT device (botnet). This 
scenario is very efficient especially if BotMaster wants to give 
one command to all botnet at once (e.g. launch a DDoS attack, 
send a large amount of spam or phishing emails [24]). 
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Fig. 12. Botnet command and control scenario using MQTT 
IV. CONCLUSION 
MQTT is one of the protocols used in IoT system where 
several scenarios to attack this protocol has been discussed in 
this paper. The first scenario takes places in the public network 
where we can scan the network by using Shodan search engine 
to search MQTT public server to make denial of service attack 
to devices (clients) connected to that broker or get/send 
incorrect data to its clients. This public broker can become a 
good candidate to control the botnet because of the nature of 
MQTT publish and subscribe. Then, from the local network, an 
attacker can sniff and modify packet data from the network to 
attack data privacy, data integrity, and MQTT authentication 
mechanism. Moreover, using nonstandard port (port obscurity) 
does not improve the security of MQTT at all.  
For mitigation purpose, a security mechanism for MQTT 
protocol must be implemented such as TLS, which is a good 
choice if the IoT devices that are used is an unconstrained 
device. Besides using TLS, Singh et.al. [25] have proposed 
another security mechanism based on ECC which focuses on 
data confidentiality with less resource requirement compared to 
TLS. Furthermore, Mektoubi et.al [26] have performed a study 
comparing RSA and ECC to protect the data confidentiality 
and provide good non-repudiation. In the case of constrained 
devices, Niruntasukrat et.al. [3] have tried to make a security 
mechanism that focused on authentication and authorization of 
the devices to broker while Katsikeas [27] uses AES 
encryption that focuses on confidentiality and message 
authenticity. Security mechanism of MQTT protocol, 
especially for resource constrained device still need 
development because each research that has been done still 
have certain focus which not yet integrated. 
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